Strategy
Political investment or investment policy?

Xavier de Laforcade Partner
Head of Portfolio Management
Rothschild Martin Maurel
Since the end of World War II, the ties between political decisions, economics and financial markets have become central to the dynamics that shape our societies: this interdependence can clearly be witnessed through the multiple, complex and complementary mechanisms at work.
If we look specifically at the global financial markets, we can see that they are predominantly guided by three main drivers:
1. Monetary and fiscal policies. These play a crucial role mainly by way of central bank decisions on interest rates and asset purchasing programmes, alongside fiscal decisions taken by governments in terms of public spending or taxation, which can for example amplify or hinder capital flows into the various asset classes.
2. The global macroeconomic environment, where growth, inflation and international trade directly influence investor expectations.
3. Business fundamentals, including in particular EPS growth, operating margins, FCF, etc., which determine the intrinsic robustness of corporate stocks and bonds. Historically speaking, political uncertainty tends to raise volatility on the bond markets, impacting the level of sovereign yields and credit spreads1 alike. For example, the Italian government crisis in July 2022 caused the spread between the Italian 10-year and its German equivalent to shoot up to 232 basis points, highlighting the jittery nerves experienced by creditors during this time of political instability. Another example can be cited from 2024, an entire year marked by the intensity of political factors at play. Multiple major elections took place (presidential election in the US, European elections, dissolution of the National Assembly in France, legislative elections in Germany, federal election in Canada, etc.), generating uncertainty over future political orientations.
From a more general standpoint, since the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and the return of US protectionism, investors have tended to price political risk into their macroeconomic forecasts. Recent geopolitical and external shocks (Brexit, US-China trade war, pandemic, war in Ukraine, etc.) have heightened awareness of the cyclical risks associated with sudden shifts in political heading. They have also increased the correlation between macroeconomic and market variables: for example, inflation fuelled by supply tensions led to synchronised monetary tightening around the world in 2022, sending stocks and bonds tumbling together.
Accordingly, the current configuration of the markets, featuring persistently high valuation multiples in certain segments along with tightened credit spreads, would appear highly sensitive to any political paradigm shifts.
Are we headed for a rebalanced "world order" ?
In recent years we have seen a resurgence in US economic patriotism, with the world’s leading economy veering its policy towards domestic priorities. During his first term, Donald Trump had already established massive custom duties in order to “protect” US industry (tariffs as high as 25% on over $360 billion in Chinese imports), thus breaking with decades of growing free trade.
While the Biden administration adopted a more multilateral tone, it still maintained these tariffs at their core and stepped up domestic manufacturing support by way of major investment plans (CHIPS Act for semi-conductors, infrastructure plan and Inflation Reduction Act for green technologies). The percentage of China in total US imports thus dropped from 22% in 2017 to roughly 13% in 2024.
Since the second half of 2023, Mexico has even replaced China as the United States’ top trade partner (15% of imports in 2024), reflecting the regional relocation (nearshoring) of supply chains.
Meanwhile, China’s economic landscape has also evolved in line with internal political choices: the “reform and opening up” policy that made a global manufacturing leader of China is currently giving way to a development strategy focused more on the domestic market and high technology.
Overall, the combination of rising payroll costs and foreign trade barriers has led multinational corporations to diversify their production bases by making them more local.
Another significant aspect that can be seen in the re-balancing of the world order is how determined certain countries are to reduce their dependence on the US dollar in international trade. For decades, the dollar has served as the world’s reserve currency, making up some 60% of foreign exchange reserves.
This new quest for independence can be observed in multiple strategic initiatives.
One of the first noteworthy measures was China’s decision to stop massively purchasing dollars, and to use the renminbi (yuan) in international trade, particularly in Asia and with certain strategic partner countries. In doing so, China has gradually reduced its exposure to USD-denominated assets: its Treasury2 holdings slid from around $1,300 billion in 2013 to $850 billion at end-2023, their lowest level since 2010. At the same time, several “emerging” countries have entered into bilateral agreements to settle their trade in local currencies, thus bypassing the dollar altogether. Meanwhile, central banks have stepped up this trend by accumulating more than 1,000 metric tons of gold per year over the last 4 years
New geopolitical chessboard : BRICS and rise of "emerging" countries
On the global stage, new hands are being dealt even more quickly in response to coalition policy decisions. The BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) has become institutionalised and also expanded: during the Johannesburg Summit in August 2023, six new countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, United Arab Emirates) were invited to join in 2024.
This move will see BRICS+ countries expand to nearly 45% of the world population and consolidate their share of global GDP (expressed as purchasing power parity) at around 36%, significantly overshooting the combined weight of the G7 (now at around 30%).
The argument put forward is that these countries are seeking a “fairer world order”, one that reflects the actual economic weight of “emerging” countries. These countries are aiming for greater influence in international governance, arguing for reforms to institutions stemming from Bretton Woods (IMF, World Bank) in order to give more of a voice to developing economies, and supporting the expansion of the UN Security Council to include new members from Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Alternative forums are also gaining visibility: BRICS+ have set up their own development bank (New Development Bank) in addition to working with the World Bank, are discussing payment mechanisms denominated in local currencies, and serve as a platform to dispute certain “Western” policies...
“ The impact of political decisions on certain major investment themes and evolving sectors is nothing new ”
So what's going on in Europe ?
The European Union, traditionally more integrated in terms of trade than fiscal policy, has been driven to bolster its financial strength by a series of crises. The response to the sovereign debt crisis (2010- 2012), for example, was decidedly monetary and came with the infamous “whatever it takes” tagline coined by then-ECB Chairman Mario Draghi in reference to saving the euro. When confronted with the Covid-19 crisis, however, the EU-27 bloc took an innovative step in 2020 when it launched the €750bn NextGenerationEU stimulus plan, paid for with a European joint debt programme.
Then, the war in Ukraine upset the balance of security across the continent, triggering a race to rearm in multiple Western countries. This strategic awakening gave rise to unprecedented investment plans. Germany, for example, recently voted for a special defence fund of €100 billion, and France also plans to raise its defence budget 40% by 2030.
At present, budget coordination is the more sought-after objective. On 4 March 2025, the European Commission presented its ReArm Europe plan and announced a series of measures aimed at increasing Defence spending at EU level, offering member states innovative means to fund these investments.
In keeping with the legislative elections, Germany also crossed a historic threshold by adopting strong measures, including the creation of a 10-year, €500 billion infrastructure fund dedicated to public projects, the addition of 0.35% of GDP to the federal budget, and the exemption of Defence spending in excess of 1% of GDP from the calculation of the deficit.
Political investment or investment policy ?
The impact of political decisions on certain major investment themes and evolving sectors is nothing new. The first public investments in Silicon Valley can be traced back to the early 1950s, and the swift expansion of start-ups and venture capital firms in tech sector development dates back to the 1970s.
More recently, the emergence and rapid adoption of Artificial Intelligence have accelerated this phenomenon. In January 2025, President Trump unveiled the Stargate project, a joint initiative by OpenAI, Oracle and SoftBank aimed at investing up to $500 billion in AI infrastructure in the United States. The goal of the project being to build up computing power and stimulate the US economy by creating more than 100,000 jobs. For his part, French President Emmanuel Macron in early February announced the establishment of a multiyear joint investment plan (private sector, French government, foreign powers) totalling €109 billion.
Major political decisions are there to provide strong guidance, set a priority and promote the means to achieve it. They strive to prevent or slow any obstacles in order to make the necessary possible. At the same time, if such strong decisions are challenged too often, a lot of hard work can end up going to waste. A great example of this can be taken from the European automotive industry, which has had to deal with all too frequent policy changes governing electric vehicles.
The instability of subsidies and regulations most definitely makes it harder for sector players to set long-term plans, thus stifling innovation, undermining their competitiveness and weighing on their margins. Conversely, China has successfully constructed a more stable framework, promoting the emergence of national champions that now enjoy a major technological and commercial edge on the global stage.
More recently (over the last ten years), we have thus seen the resurgence of politicians and political takes that can be described as more deep-rooted, more “patriotic” and more extreme, while also less “consensual” or diplomatic.
Another way to describe them is as more “populist” and less democratic in the primary sense of the term (separation of powers, equal rights, freedom of expression, sovereignty of the people, etc.).
In terms of financial management, this change in the type of general environment (de-globalisation, emergence of authoritarian leaders, trade war, forex control, advent of unregulated financial systems, etc.) is introducing new conditions that must then be factored into our decisions on asset allocation and choice of investment vehicles. Certain key factors in recent years, which are foundational for the financial markets, simply did not prove “feasible” in the sense that well-established rules deemed immutable by the industry were simply broken outright, most of the time for “good reason”!
Let’s look at three examples. First, the possibility for central banks to use their balance sheet with no real limitations in order to inherently influence the price of listed assets (fixed income and stocks), or even to have negative key rates. Second, the recent – and more surprising – decision by Germany to exclude certain expenses from the calculation of budget deficits, allowing them to comply with a constitutional rule... simply because they subjectively elected to avoid it altogether! Third, and this one is very relevant to current times, the almost-daily announcements of changes to tariff rates with one or another US “trade partner” by a President for whom it can be said that no one actually knows if he ultimately and constitutionally is merely acting on his own whims!
From a portfolio management perspective, there have always been uncertainties to consider when making decisions! And there always will be. To put it plainly, at this point in time, the level of uncertainty (not to mention its intensity) is of more fundamental import than it was in the early 2000s. A simple decision, sometimes purely personal, can result in a new standard, a new set of conditions, a new ban... which can upend the economic future of an entire country, sector or group of companies, whether publicly traded or not!
In this type of environment, forecasting is weak at best: right now if we ask ourselves if one or another scenario is possible, all we can really say is “almost anything is possible!” Rather than trying to predict the future (which we still have to at least try to do), it is more important to develop flexibility and adaptability in addressing what just yesterday would have seemed impossible! Ultimately, and almost unanimously, is that not what fundamentally characterises that which is most “vital” in human nature?
Preparing for, hoping for and accepting the unexpected and taking action, while tuning out all the discouraging white noise or paralysing fears!
(1) A spread is the difference between the yields of a bond versus an equivalent-maturity loan considered “risk-free”
(2) US government bonds